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Abstract
We study the consequences of concern for relative position and status
in a public good economy. We consider a group of agents who are engaged
in a contest for position whereby a set of rewards are distributed accord-
ing to relative status. The extent of concern for rewards, together with
the relative magnitude of rewards, will have an impact on agents’ willing-
ness to contribute to public goods. Depending on the nature of prizes,
i.e. whether higher private good consumption is rewarded or punished,
the contest for relative position will either exacerbate or ameliorate the
free-riding problem inherent in public good environments. In addition to
examining the implications of concern for relative position, we also con-
sider how an appropriate scheme of rewards might be designed to induce
more eﬃcient levels of public good.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to study the consequences of concern for relative
position and status in an economy with public goods. We consider a group
of agents who are engaged in a contest for position whereby a set of rewards
are distributed according to relative status. The extent of concern for rewards,
together with the relative magnitude of rewards, will have an impact on agents’
willingness to contribute to public goods. Depending on the nature of prizes, i.e.
whether higher private good consumption is rewarded or punished, the contest
∗I would like to thank my advisor Andrew Postlewaite and George Mailath for very helpful
comments and advice. I would also like to thank Murat Sertel and the participants of the
Seminar in Economic Design and Management at Bog˘aziçi University (Fall 1996) where this
paper was presented for helpful comments.
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for relative position or status will either exacerbate or ameliorate the free-riding
problem inherent in public good environments. In addition to examining the
implications of concern for relative position, we also consider how an appropriate
scheme of rewards might be designed to induce more eﬃcient levels of public
good.
The notion that individuals might value their relative standing or status in a
society has recently received some renewed attention in economics. The related
literature goes back to Veblen [35] who argued that wealthy individuals engaged
in conspicuous consumption of certain goods and services in order to signal their
wealth, which in turn conferred on them higher social status which they valued.
Duesenberry [17] explored the economic implications of concern for status, and
studied its impact on the consumption and saving behavior. Hirsch [22] pointed
out the role of social status in the context of growth, and argued that social
scarcity implied by the relative nature of social rewards resulted in crowding
and rent seeking which limits growth. More recently, Frank [20], Robson [33],
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite [12], Fershtman and Weiss [19], Bakshi and Chen
[6], among others, studied the impact of introducing status into agents’ utility
functions on various economic behavior and outcomes such as consumption, risk
taking behavior, stock price volatility, and economic growth.1
Including concern for relative position and status directly into agents’ utility
functions, while in accord with the sociological approach which insists on the
importance behavior dictated by social norms, begs the question, however, of
why individuals should care about them in the economic sense. Cole, Mailath,
and Postlewaite [12] provided a model where they demonstrated that the exis-
tence of goods and decisions which are not allocated or made through markets,
can endogenously generate an economic concern for relative position and status.
They argued that the status of an agent can be interpreted as a ranking device
whereby a society solves the problem of allocating certain nonmarketed goods.
If, as in their paper, higher wealth implies higher status, and higher status in
turn implies a higher valued match in marriage, then agents will have a rational
reason to care about their relative position in the economy and to adjust their
economic behavior accordingly. One can consider nonmarket decisions other
than a matching decision, and similarly argue that concern for relative wealth
endogenously creates incentives that will eﬀect economic variables. Note that
concern for relative wealth here is not put into the utility function directly, but
arises indirectly because final consumption of (both marketed and nonmarketed)
goods depends not just on wealth but also on relative wealth. We treat their
analysis as providing a foundation for the induced reduced-form utility func-
tions we consider here which directly incorporate concern for relative position
and status.
Another line of economic research in which concern for relative position
arises is the literature on rank-order tournaments, or contests, as compensation
schemes in economies with imperfect information.2 These are compensation
1See also Abel [1], Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite [13], and and Bagwell and Bernheim [5].
2 See Lazear and Rosen [24], Holmstrom [23], Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz [29], Green and Stokey
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schemes in which pay depends on an agent’s relative performance rather than
only on the absolute level of her input or output. Agents’ concern for relative
position is thus based solely on economic considerations. Work on rank-order
contests is concerned with identification of conditions under which tournaments
(contests) provide optimal work incentives, and with derivation of optimal con-
test structures using monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice
variables. It is typically assumed that each agent’s eﬀort have no direct eﬀect
on another agent’s output.3
Work on optimal auctions and war of attrition in environments with incom-
plete information also involve purely economic concern for relative position on
the part of participating agents.4
The economy we consider in this paper consists of a group of n identical
agents who have preferences defined over a private good, a pure public good,
and a set of n prizes to be accorded to each agent according to her relative
position or status in the group. Each agent starts with an initial endowment
ωi ≥ 0 of the private good, the value of which is known only to the agent herself.
The single private good can be thought of as composite good or money. Agents
then take part in a Bayesian game by simultaneously contributing a nonnegative
amount out of their initial endowments toward production of the public good.
We assume that the private good consumption financed by the residual wealth,
i.e. the amount of initial endowment left after contribution to the public good,
is completely observable, and the prize an agent receives depends on her relative
position in the distribution of private good consumption levels. The agent with
the highest private good consumption receives the highest prize, the agent with
the second highest private good consumption receives the second highest prize,
and so on.
Prizes that agents care about, and which are distributed according to the
rank-order contest described above, can be given an interpretation as in Cole,
Mailath, and Postlewaite [12] to be quantitites of a nonmarketed good. Concern
for ordinal rank and status on the part of agents is not for its own sake, but
because rank determines how a nonmarketed good is allocated in the group.
When higher status is associated with higher private good consumption, we
demonstrate how in equilibrium agents contribute less toward the public good
than the the amount they would have contributed in the absence of concern for
relative position. Given the generic ineﬃciency of the voluntary contribution
equilibrium in standard public good environments, this implies that concern for
relative position may lead to further ineﬃciency. When coercive methods, such
as taxation, cannot eﬀectively be resorted to for the provision of a public good,
[21], O’Keeﬀe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser [30].
3An exception is a paper by Drago and Turnbull [16]. They consider a tournament with
(positive) team externalities. Group eﬀort is not perfectly separable with respect to individual
contributions. Incentives to free-ride increases with the externality, as shirking is less likely
to result in loss of the tournament.
4 See Milgrom and Weber [27], McAfee and McMillan [26], Bulow and Roberts [11] on
auctions and bidding, and Bishop et al. [9] and Riley [32] on war of attrition. See also Bliss
and Nalebuﬀ [10] for an application of optimal auction literature to the problem of private
provision of a discrete public good.
3
and therefore it is to be provided through voluntary contributions, concern for
relative position will exacerbate the free-riding problem.
Arguing that the concern for relative position and status might play a role
in allocating certain nonmarketed goods provides an individual rationale for
why agents will care about them. Arrow [3], on the other hand, argued for
the collective rationality of norms that involve social rewards, such as prestige
and status. Ineﬃciencies arising from market failures (due to, for example,
externalities and public goods), might render it collectively rational for the
society to settle on an agreement (a social custom or a norm) to improve the
eﬃciency of the economic system by providing commodities, such as prestige
and status, which cannot be bought and sold.5
Arrow’s interpretation of norms as social agreements to provide certain com-
modities and to allocate them to curtail ineﬃciencies brings about the question
of whether social rewards, such as prestige and reward, can be used to provide
incentives for more eﬃcient provision of public goods. Using the explicitly de-
rived equilibrium behavior of agents in our model, we are able to determine an
optimal contest structure by suitably choosing prize spreads in a rank-order con-
test in which higher private good consumption is punished. A negative prize for
higher consumption lead agents in equilibrium to consume less private good,and
therefore contribute more toward the public good. Appropriate choice of spread
between prizes results in contributions that lead to the ex-post eﬃcient level of
public. We can interpret a negative prize as stigma attached to consuming more
private good.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the specific
model we use to examine the issues raised above. In Section 3 we derive the
equilibrium of the rank-order contest in private good consumption levels, and
study its properties. In order to simplify the exposition, the linear equilibrium
strategies that arise in our model are first studied in detail for the 2-agent case,
followed by the extension to the n-agent case. Section 4 considers a set of prizes
that will lead to eﬃcient public good provision. It also includes a discussion
of the relation between a contribution contest as a public good provision mech-
anism and the general expected utility maximizing mechanisms studied in the
mechanism design literature. Section 5 includes a discussion of the assumptions
deriving the specific forms of our results and some concluding words.
2 Model
Consider a group of n agents, and let N = {1, · · ·, n} denote the set of agents for
a given n, n ≥ 2. Agents are assumed to have identical preferences over a private
good, a pure public good, and a set of n prizes to be accorded to each agent
5See Elster [18] for a critique of this view of social norms. He contends that not all norms
are Pareto-improvements, which is implicit in Arrow’s view of social norms as unanimous
agreements to enhance eﬃciency; that some norms that would make everybody better oﬀ are
not observed; and, finally, that even if a norm induces a Pareto improvement, this does not
by itself explain why it exists.
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according to his relative position or status in the group. Each agent i, i ∈ N ,
starts with an initial endowment ωi ≥ 0 of the private good, the value of which
is known only to the agent herself. The single private good can be thought
of as composite good or money. The agents then simultaneously contribute
a nonnegative amount out of their initial endowments toward production of
the public good. We assume that the private good consumption, financed by
wealth remaining after the contribution to the public good is made, is completely
observable, and the prize an agent receives depends on her relative position in
the distribution of private good consumption levels. The agent with the highest
final private good consumption level receives the highest prize, the agent with
the second highest final private good consumption level receives the second
highest prize, and so on. The spread between each prize level, and how much
an agent cares about the prize will both have an impact an agent’s voluntary
contribution toward the public good.
Let yi ∈ [0, ωi] denote the contribution of agent i toward public good pro-
duction. There is no public good initially. The public good is produced through
a technology that converts one unit of private good into one unit of public good.
With the given technology the total amount of public good produced and con-
sumed will be Y =
P
i∈N yi. Let xi = (ωi − yi) denote agent i’s private good
consumption level. Note that xi ∈ [0, ωi], for all i ∈ N . Let {P1, P2, · · ·, Pn},
Pj ∈ <, for all j ∈ N , denote the set of prizes (where < represents the real
line), and let Ri ∈ {P1, P2, · · ·, Pn} denote the prize received by agent i, for all
i ∈ N . We assume that P1 ≤ P2 ≤ · · · ≤ Pn, i.e. P1 is the lowest prize and
Pn is the highest prize. The utility functions we consider to represent agents’
identical preferences will have the additively separable form u(xi, Y ) + v(Ri),
where u : <2+ → < , and v : < → < is strictly increasing. It will therefore be
convenient to express prizes in terms of utility. So let {p1, p2, · · ·, pn}, where
pj = v(Pj), for all j ∈ N , denote the set of prizes in terms of utility, and let
ri ∈ {p1, p2, · · ·, pn} denote prize in terms of utility received by an agent i, for
all i ∈ N . For simplicity and tractability we make the following assumption on
the utility functions of agents.
Assumption 1: The preferences of agents are represented by the utility func-
tion U i (xi, Y, ri) = xiY + αri, i ∈ N, where xi ≥ 0, Y ≥ 0, ri ∈ <, and
α ≥ 0 is a scalar.
We assume that all agents have complete information about all aspects of
the economy except for the actual level of initial endowments of agents other
than themselves. All agents believe it is common knowledge that ωi are drawn
independently from the same continuous and strictly increasing cumulative dis-
tribution function F (ω) defined on [ω, ω], where 0 ≤ ω ≤ ω . The corresponding
density function f(ω) is strictly positive on [ω, ω]. We will assume that ω is uni-
formly distributed.
Assumption 2: The priors of the other agents about the initial endowment ωi
of agent i, for all i ∈ N , is identical and given by the distribution function
F (ω) = (ω − ω) /∆ω, where ∆ω = ω − ω is the size of the support.
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The information structure described above induces a Bayesian game of vol-
untary contributions toward public good in which the initial endowment ωi is
agent i’s type. A pure-strategy for each agent i is a contribution level yi as a
function of her initial endowment ωi, i.e. yi = yi(ωi). The payoﬀ to each agent
will depend on the amount she contributes, the total amount contributed by the
rest of the agents, and on how her private good consumption level xi = (ωi−yi)
ranks among all private good consumption levels, which determines the prize
she receives. We will study the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the
specified game.
3 A Contest in Private Good Consumption Lev-
els
We recall our assumption that private good consumption levels of all agents
become perfectly observable after they make their contributions toward the
public good. The highest prize pn is then assigned to the agent with the highest
final private good consumption level, the second highest prize pn−1 is assigned
to the agent with the second highest private good consumption level, and so on.
We will first present the nature of equilibria we are interested in for the case
of two agents, i.e. for n = 2. This will allow a simpler presentation of the
nature of strategic interaction among agents that arises when there is concern
for relative position in a public good model of the sort we study here. We will
later present the extension of results for n > 2.
3.1 The case of two agents
With two agents let ph and pl represent the high prize and the low prize, re-
spectively. Since xi = (ωi − yi), we can equivalently consider each agent i as
choosing a private good consumption level. Agent i’s strategy will therefore be a
function xi : [ω, ω]→ <+, specifying for each possible value of ωi the amount of
private good agent i will choose. The agents take their actions simultaneously.
If both agents choose the same amount, we assume that each gets the high prize
with probability 12 . The payoﬀ to agent i if her initial endowment is ωi, agent
j’s strategy is xj(·) , and she chooses a private good consumption level xi will
be
V i (xi, xj (·) , ωi) =
Z
{ωj |xj(·)<xi}
[xi (ωi − xi + ωj − xj (·)) + αph] f (ωj) dωj
+
R
{ωj |xj(·)>xi}
[xi (ωi − xi + ωj − xj (·)) + αpl] f (ωj) dωj
.
(1)
The first term is agent i’s expected utility if agent j chooses a private good
consumption level less than xi, and the second term is his expected utility if
agent j chooses a level greater than xi.
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Definition 1 : (bx1 (ω1) , bx2 (ω2)) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the two
person contribution game if for all i ∈ {1, 2}, ωi ∈ [ω, ω], and xi ∈ [0, ωi],
V i (bxi (ωi) , bxj (ωj) , ωi) ≥ V i (xi (ωi) , bxj (ωj) , ωi) .
We will look for profiles in which each agent’s strategy is a strictly increasing
and continuous function of his initial endowment. Consider such a function
xi with inverse Φi , i.e. Φi (xi) is the initial endowment of the agent who
chooses xi.6 Transforming the variable of integration7 in (1) from ωj to xj , we
diﬀerentiate V i (xi, xj (·) , ωi) with respect to xi to get
dV i
dxi
= Φi (xi)− 2xi +
Z xj
0
[Φj (xj)− xj ] f (Φj (xj))Φ0j (xj) dxj
+ α (ph − pl) f (Φj (xi))Φ0j (xi)
, (2)
where, given that xj (·) is strictly increasing, xj = xj (ω) is the maximum
amount of private good that can be consumed by agent j 6= i. The first-order
condition at an interior optimum is obtained by setting (2) equal to zero, which
can also be arrived at by observing that at an equilibrium an agent with ini-
tial endowment ωi and contributing xi > 0 cannot increase her expected utility
by choosing xi + dxi instead of xi ≡ xi (ωi). This increase yields a benefit of
α (ph − pl) if player j chooses in the interval [xi, xi + dxi). This will be the case
if ωj is in the interval [Φj (xi) ,Φj (xi + dxi)), and this occurs with probability
f (Φj (xi))Φ0j (xi) dxi. The expected incremental cost associated with an in-
crease of dxi equals minus the expected value of {∂ (xi (ωi − xi + ωj − xj)) /∂xi} dxi.
Equating the cost and benefits we obtain the same expression implied by equat-
ing (2) equal to zero.8 Therefore at a symmetric equilibrium we will have
ω − 2bx (ω) + Z ω
Φ(0)
[ω − bx (ω)] f (ω) dω + α (ph − pl) f (ω)bx0 (ω) = 0, (3)
which we obtain from (2) by setting it to zero, dropping the subscripts, substi-
tuting ω = Φ (bx) throughout, and using the fact that Φ0 = 1/x0.9
To understand the nature of possible equilibrium strategies for the Bayesian
game considered here, it will be helpful to look at the outcome of the complete
information version of the voluntary contribution game between two agents when
there is no concern for relative position. Let the utilities of two agents i and j be
as in (??) with α = 0 (or ph = pl), and let ωi ≥ 0 and ωj ≥ 0 be their mutually
known initial endowment levels, respectively. Each agent will therefore choose
a contribution level yi ∈ [0, ωi] to maximize utility, and it can be checked to see
6Note that the function Φi(·) is well defined and diﬀerentiable (except for a finite number
of points), since it is the inverse of a strictly monotonic function, continuous, and bounded.
7The density g(ω) of x = z(ω) when z(·) is a strictly increasing function is given by the
formula g(x) = f

z−1 (x)
 
z−1
0, where f (ω) is the density of ω.
8The global second-order conditions are satisfied if the firs-order conditions are (see the
proof of Proposition 4 below).
9Φ (x (ω)) ≡ ω ≡ x−1 (x (ω)), and by the inverse function theorem we have Φ0 = 1/x0.
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that at the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of this contribution game each
agent will contribute an amount equal to
yi = max
n
0, 2ωi−ωj3
o
, i 6= j, (4)
out of their initial endowments toward the public good and consume an amount
equal to
xi = min
n
ωi,
ωi+ωj
3
o
, i 6= j, (5)
as private good. Expressions (4) and (5) reveal that if ωi ≤ 12ωj , agent i will not
contribute anything toward the public good and consume all of her endowment.
That is, she will completely free ride on the amount 12ωj contributed by agent
j. This property of free riding carries over to the case when there are n > 2
agents with identical preferences: there will be a critical initial endowment
level ω0 such that agents with initial endowments above ω0 will contribute a
strictly positive amount, and agents with initial endowments at or below ω0 will
contribute zero.10
Now assume that agents have incomplete information regarding the initial
endowments of all agents other than themselves. With no concern for relative
position, i.e. α = 0 (or ph = pl), consider a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy
profile (bx1 (ω1) , bx2 (ω2)) of the contribution game. For each ωi, bxi (ωi) must
satisfy
bxi (ωi) ∈ argmax
xi
(
xi
Ã
ωi − xi +
Z ω
ω
(ωj − bxj (ωj)) f (ωj) dωj!) , i 6= j,
(6)
which implies that either
ωi − 2bxi (ωi) + Z ω
ω
(ωj − bxj (ωj)) f (ωj) dωj = 0, (i)
or
ωi − 2bxi (ωi) + Z ω
ω
(ωj − bxj (ωj)) f (ωj) dωj > 0 and bxi (ωi) = ωi, (ii)
or
ωi − 2bxi (ωi) + Z ω
ω
(ωj − bxj (ωj)) f (ωj) dωj < 0 and bxi (ωi) = 0. (iii)
That the second-order conditions are satisfied whenever the first-order con-
ditions are can easily be checked. We observe that (iii) never holds, so the
boundary constraint xi ≥ 0 is not binding. Note, however, that (ii) may be
binding. That is, an agent may consume all of her endowment as private
10See Andreoni [2] for an exposition of this property of public good contribution games for
identical and heterogenous preferences in a more general setting than ours.
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good and contribute none toward the public good. As in the complete in-
formation case, agents with initial endowments less than a critical value ω0 =R ω
ω (ωj − bxj (ωj)) f (ωj) dωj will consume all of their initial endowments.
Now we will exhibit a pair of symmetric equilibrium strategies which will
incorporate a cut oﬀ initial endowment level ω0 ∈ [ω, ω] and which will be
linear in initial endowment when an agent does contribute, i.e.
bx (ω) = ½ ω if ω ≤ ω < ω0
aω + b if ω0 ≤ ω ≤ ω
. (7)
The continuity of the strategies requires that aω0 + b = ω0, which implies
that b = (1−a)ω0. For an agent with ω ≥ ω0 the first order condition (i) above
must be satisfied. Given our assumption that F (ω) = ω−ω∆ω , this leads to
(1− 2a)ω −
µ
2 +
ω − ω0
∆ω
¶
b+
1− a
2∆ω
¡
ω2 − ω20
¢
= 0. (8)
Since this equation must hold for all ω ∈ (ω0, ω], we can identify that a = 12
by observing that (1 − 2a) must be zero. Similarly, by making use of b =
(1− 2a)ω0 = 12ω0, we get
ω0 = (ω + 2∆ω)− 2
p
(ω +∆ω)∆ω, (9)
which also identifies b. Note that ω0 < ω.11 We must also check that the
equilibrium strategy specified in (7) satisfies the first order condition (ii) for
ω < ω0. That it does can be seen by noting that
−ω +
Z ω
ω0
∙
ωj −
1
2
(ωj − ω0)
¸
1
∆ω
dω > 0⇐⇒ ω < ω0.
Figure 1.1 dsiplays the shape of the symmetric equilibrium strategy for
ω0 > ω. The equilibrium strategy bx (ω) is continuous and strictly increasing
in the initial endowment. The amount contributed toward the public good
in equilibrium with initial endowment ω is denoted by by (ω) in the figure, and
equals the diﬀerence between initial endowment level and the equilibrium choice
of private good consumption level. Agents with ω ≤ ω0 consume all of their
initial endowments as private good and contribute zero toward the public good.
The slope of the equilibrium private good consumption function for ω > ω0 is
1
2 , which is a consequence of the specific functional form xiY we employed to
represent agents’ preferences over the private and the public good.
We noted above that we always have ω0 < ω. But if ω < 5ω, then ω0 < ω,
and (7) no longer applies. We check in this case the first-order condition (i) to see
that both agents will contribute a positive amount at a symmetric equilibrium
11The other solution to the quadratic expression involving ω0 that 6 implies is a value
greater than ω, and it can be checked from the first order conditions (i)-(iii) above that the
suggested strategy will not be an equilibrium in this case.
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by setting their private good consumption levels at bx(ω) = 12ω + ω+ω12 < ω, for
all ω ∈ [ω, ω].
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 involve cases where ω0 ≤ ω. Figure 1.2 shows the case
where ω = 5ω so that ω0 = ω. In this case type ω agent does not contribute to-
ward the public good while all other types contribute strictly positive amounts.
Figure 1.3 is drawn for the case where ω < 5ω so that ω0 < ω, and all types of
agents contribute strictly positive amounts toward the public good in equilib-
rium.
Proposition 2 below summarizes the symmetric equilibrium strategies we
have thus derived for the two-person Bayesian contribution game with uniform
distribution of initial endowments.
Proposition 2 : Let the utilities of agents be as in (??) with α = 0 (or
ph = pl), and let their initial endowments be uniformly distributed on [ω, ω].
If ω0 < ω, where ω0 is as in (9) then private good consumption levels at a sym-
metric equilibrium of the 2-agent Bayesian contribution game will be given by
the function bx∗(ω) = 12ω + ω+ω12 , ∀ω ∈ [ω,ω] , (10)
implying strictly positive contributions toward the public good by all types of
agents. If ω0 ≥ ω, then equilibrium private good consumption levels will be
given by bx∗(ω) = ½ ω if ω ≤ ω < ω01
2 (ω + ω0) if ω0 ≤ ω ≤ ω
, (11)
implying that agents with initial endowments less than or equal ω0 will contribute
zero amount toward the public good.
Note that the equilibrium strategies (10) and (11) exhibited in Proposition
2 have the property that bx∗(ω0) = bx∗(ω0). That is, the equilibrium strategy
changes continuously with the cut oﬀ initial endowment level ω0.
Proposition 2 also shows that a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the two-person
contribution game with uniformly distributed type space may involve strictly
positive ex-post contributions toward the public good by both agents, or only
one of the agents, or by neither of the agents. When ω ≥ 5ω so that ω0 ∈ [ω,ω],
if both agents have initial endowments less than or equal to ω0, then they
will both choose to consume all of their endowments and no public good will
be provided, a gross ineﬃciency in the ex-post sense. If, on the other hand,
ω < 5ω, i.e. when the support of the type distribution is small, then all types
contribute at the equilibrium.
Example 3 : Let ω ∈ [1, 2]. Then ω0 = 4 − 2
√
3 ≈ 0.54. Both agents will
contribute a positive amount toward the public good and consume bx(ω) = 12ω +
1
4 < ω, for all ω ∈ [1, 2]. If ω ∈ [0, 1], then ω0 = 3− 2
√
2 ≈ 0.172, and agents
with ω ∈ [0, 0.172] will consume all of their initial endowments as private good,
while agents with ω ∈ (0.172, 1] will contribute by(ω) = ω−bx(ω) = 12 (ω − 0.172).
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Returning to the case when relative position does matter, i.e. when α (ph − pl) >
0, we will now show that linear strategies similar to those we have just described
for the case with no concern for relative position will satisfy the first-order
conditions given in (3) for an interior optimum. The diﬀerence will be that
the cut oﬀ level of initial endowment ω0 = Φ (0) will change due to the term
α (ph − pl) f(ω)x0(ω) , which reflects the impact of concern for relative position.
Proposition 4 : Let the utilities of agents be as in (??), and let their initial
endowments be uniformly distributed on [ω, ω]. If α (ph − pl) < (4ω−5∆ω)∆ω8 ,
then private good consumption levels at a symmetric equilibrium of the 2-agent
Bayesian contest will be given by
bx∗ (ω) = 12ω + ω+ω12 + 23α (ph−pl)∆ω ∀ω ∈ [ω, ω] , (12)
implying strictly positive contributions toward the public good by all types of
agents. If (4ω−5∆w)∆ω8 ≤ α (ph − pl) ≤
ω∆ω
2 , then equilibrium private good
consumption levels will be given by
bx∗ (ω) = ½ ω if ω < ω01
2 (ω + ω0) if ω ≥ ω0
, (13)
where
ω0 = (ω + 2∆w)− 2
p
(ω +∆ω)∆ω − 2α (ph − pl), (14)
implying that agents with initial endowments less than or equal ω0 will contribute
zero amount toward the public good.
Proof. Assume that α (ph − pl) < (4ω−5∆w)∆ω8 . We check to see that the pro-
posed linear strategy in (12) does satisfy the first-order condition (3) for an inte-
rior optimum. To see that the global second order conditions will also be satisfied
when the first-order conditions are, note from (2) that ∂
2V i
∂x∂ωi
= 1 > 0. Sup-
pose that there exists a type ωi and a strategy x0i such that V
i (x0i, xj (·) , ωi) >
V i (xi, xj (·) , ωi) , where xi = bxi (ωi) . This implies thatZ x0i
xi
∂V i
∂x
(x, xj (·) , ωi) dx > 0.
Using the first-order condition ∂V
i
∂x (x, xj (·) ,Φi (x)) = 0, for all x, we haveZ x0i
xi
µ
∂V i
∂x
(x, xj (·) , ωi)− ∂V
i
∂x
(x, xj (·) ,Φi (x))
¶
dx > 0.
This is equivalent toZ x0i
xi
Z ωi
Φi(x)
∂2V i
∂x∂ω
(x, xj (·) , ω) dωdx > 0.
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If x0i > xi, then Φi (x) > ωi for all x ∈ (xi, x0i] , but in this case the last inequality
cannot hold. And similarly for x0i < xi. So xi = xi (ωi) is globally optimal for
type ωi.
It can also be easily checked that for bx∗ (ω) < ω for α (ph − pl) < (4ω−5∆w)∆ω8 ,
i.e. all agents will contribute positive amounts toward the public good, as spec-
ified by the equilibrium strategy.
Now assume that (4ω−5∆w)∆ω8 ≤ α (ph − pl) ≤
ω∆ω
2 . We check 14 to see that
in this case ω0 is real and belongs to the interval [ω, ω]. For ω ∈ [ω0, ω], where
ω0 = Φ (0), the proposed strategies in (13) do satisfy the first-order conditions
in (3) for an interior optimum, and the second-order conditions can be similarly
checked to hold as above. That the boundary constraint x (·) ≤ ω is binding for
ω ∈ [ω, ω0) is a consequence of the fact that ω−2ω+
R ω
ω0
£
1
2 (ω − ω0)
¤
f (ω) dω+
2α(ph−pl)
∆ω > 0⇐⇒ ω < ω0.
Proposition 4 shows how the concern for relative position eﬀects contribu-
tions toward the public good. The higher the magnitude of the concern for
relative position in terms of observable private good consumption levels the
more agents will reserve resources for their private good consumption, as to be
expected. Comparing (14) and (9) we observe that for a given (uniform) initial
endowment distribution, concern for relative position leads to more expected
free riding when private good consumption levels determine relative position.
The cut oﬀ level of initial endowment below which agents do not contribute
toward the public good is higher, leading to less expected total contributions.
Proposition 4 also shows that, for a given α, with a prize diﬀerence (ph − pl)
low enough all possible types of agents will contribute. This brings out the
possibility that if one considers the problem at hand as one of designing a
reward system based on relative position in terms private good consumption,
the designer can choose a negative (ph − pl), i.e. impose a tax on higher private
good consumption, to bring about desired levels voluntarily provided public
good. We will later turn to the issue of designing a reward structure based on
relative position to induce eﬃcient levels voluntary contribution.
Example 5 : Let ω ∈ [1, 2]. We know from Example 3 that all possible types
of agents will contribute toward the public good when α (ph − pl) = 0. With
α (ph − pl) = 12 , only agents with initial endowments in the interval (1.172, 2]
will contribute. If ω ∈ [0, 1], then only with α (ph − pl) ≤ −18 will all types of
agents contribute at the equilibrium.
3.2 An n-agent rank order contest
With n agents and n prizes p1 < p2 < · · · < pn, the agent with the highest
private good consumption level receives the highest prize pn, the agent with the
second highest private good consumption level receives pn−1, and so on. This
is an n-person rank order contest in which rewards depend on the rank order of
agents in terms of private good consumption levels. In an n-agent rank order
contest of this kind, agent i will receive prize pk if and only if xi is the kth-order
statistic of (x1, · · ·, xn).
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The definition of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the contribution game
for the n-agent case is a straightforward extension of that for the 2-agent case,
and the derivation of equilibrium strategies is also a straightforward generaliza-
tion. Let the vector of strategies for agents other than agent i be denoted by
x−i (·) = (x1 (·) , · · ·, xi−1 (·) , xi+1 (·) , · · ·, xn (·)). If m > 1 agents choose the
same amount, we assume that each gets the associated prize with probability
1
m . The payoﬀ to agent i of type ωi when (n− 1) other agents choose x−i (·)
and he chooses xi will be
V i (xi, x−i (·) , ωi) =
nX
k=1
φk,n−1
Z
Ψi(xi)
· · ·
Z
Ψi(xi)
"
xi
Ã
ωi − xi +
P
j 6=i
(ωj − xj (·))
!
+ αpk
# Q
j 6=i
f (ωj) dωj ,
(15)
where, Ψi (xi) = {ωi | xi is the kth-order statistic of (xi, x−i (·))}, and φk,n−1 =
(n−1)!
(n−k)!(k−1)! .
12 As in the 2-agent case, we will look for profiles in which each
agent’s strategy is strictly increasing and continuous in type. After transform-
ing the variable of integration in (15) and rearranging, we have that for every
ωi an equilibrium strategy bxi (ωi) for agent i must satisfy
bxi (ωi) ∈ argmax
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
xjZ
0
· · ·
xjZ
0
"ÃP
j 6=i
Φj (xj)− xj
!# Q
j 6=i
f (Φj (xj))Φ0j (xj) dxj
+α
nX
k=1
φk,n−1pkF
k−1 (Φj (xi)) [1− F (Φj (xi))]n−k
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
,
(16)
where, as in the 2-agent case, Φi is the inverse of xi, and xj is the maximum
amount of private good that can be consumed by an agent j 6= i. Therefore, at
an interior optimum with symmetric strategies we must have
0 = Φ (bx)− 2bx+ xZ
0
· · ·
xZ
0
"
n−1P
j=1
(Φ (x)− x)
#
n−1Q
j=1
f (Φ (x))Φ0 (x) dx
+α
nX
k=2
φk,n−1 (pk − pk−1)F k−2 (Φ (bx)) [1− F (Φ (bx))]n−k f (Φ (bx))
. (17)
Substituting ω = Φ (x) throughout, and using Φ0 = 1/x0, we can express (17)
12We recall that the density function for the kth-order statistic in a sample of
size n drawn from a distribution G (x) with density g (x) is given by φk,n =
n!
(n−k)!(k−1)!g (x)G
k−1 (x) [1−G (x)]n−k.
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as
0 = ω − 2bx (ω) + ωZ
Φ(0)
· · ·
ωZ
Φ(0)
hPn−1
j=1 (ωj − bx (ωj))i n−1Q
j=1
f (ωj) dωj
+α f(ω)x0(ω)
nX
k=2
φk,n−1 (pk − pk−1)F k−2 (ω) [1− F (ω)]
n−k
. (18)
Proposition 6 below shows that for the case of evenly spaced prizes, i.e.
pk − pk−1 = ∆p, for all k = 2, · · ·, n, the qualitative features of the linear
symmetric equilibrium strategy we derived for the 2-agent case generalizes to
the n-agent case.
Proposition 6 : Let the utilities of agents be as in (??), and let their initial
endowments be uniformly distributed on [ω, ω]. Assume that pk − pk−1 = ∆p,
for all k = 2, · · ·, n. If
α∆p <
ω∆ω
2 (n− 1) −
(n+ 1)2 − 4
8 (n− 1)2
(∆ω)2 ,
then private good consumption levels at a symmetric equilibrium of the n-agent
Bayesian contest will be given by
bx∗ (ω) = 12ω + (n−1)(ω+ω)4(n+1) + 2(n−1)n+1 α∆p∆ω , ∀ω ∈ [ω, ω] , (19)
implying strictly positive contributions toward the public good by all types of
agents. If
ω∆ω
2 (n− 1) −
(n+ 1)2 − 4
8 (n− 1)2
(∆ω)2 ≤ α∆p ≤ ω∆ω
2 (n− 1) ,
then equilibrium private good consumption levels will be given by
bx∗ (ω) = ½ ω if ω < ω01
2 (ω + ω0) if ω ≥ ω0
,
where
ω0 =
µ
ω +
2
n− 1∆ω
¶
− 2
sµ
ω +
∆ω
n− 1
¶
∆ω
n− 1 − 2α∆p, (20)
implying that agents with initial endowments less than or equal ω0 will contribute
zero amount toward the public good.
Proof. We will only show that the assumption pk − pk−1 = ∆p, for all k =
2, · · ·, n, will allow linear equilibrium strategies of the sort we described in
Proposition 4. Parameters of the proposed strategy are then calculated as in
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Proposition 4. We note that with initial endowments uniformly distributed on
[ω, ω], and for a given∆p, the summation term in (18) that involves ∆p becomes
α
(n− 1)∆p
x0 (ω)∆w
nX
k=0
(n− 2)!
(n− 2− k)!k!F
k (ω) [1− F (ω)](n−2)−k . (21)
By the binomial formula the summation term in (21) equals (F (ω) + 1− F (ω))n−2 =
1, so (18) becomes
0 = ω − 2bx (ω) + n− 1
∆w
ωZ
Φ(0)
[ω − bx (ω)] dω + α(n− 1)∆pbx0 (ω)∆w ,
This is of the same form that allowed linear equilibrium strategies in Proposition
4 for the 2-agent case.
It can be observed from the expression in (18) and the proof of Proposition
6 that when n prizes are not evenly spaced there will not in general be an
equilibrium in linear strategies, even with the uniform distribution.
4 Eﬃcient Set of Prizes
Adopting a designer’s point of view in a public good environment a natural
question to ask is whether Pareto eﬃcient outcomes can be reached through a
mechanism under consideration. Following the suggestion by Arrow [3] to view
social rewards such as prestige and status as a mechanism to cope with the
ineﬃciencies arising from externalities, we can use the model we have developed
so far to consider whether a set of prizes can be designed to provide incentives
for more eﬃcient provision of public goods. In certain cases using prestige and
status to discourage private good consumption among a group of agents may
be an inexpensive way of promoting voluntary supply of a public good at more
eﬃcient levels.
With incomplete information as in the present model, the Pareto eﬃciency of
a mechanism can be considered in both the ex-ante sense, where the expected
utility of no type of agent can be increased without decreasing the expected
utility of another type, or in the ex-post sense, where when types of all agents
are revealed there can be no outcome that dominates the outcome under the
mechanism in the usual Pareto sense.
Assume that preferences of an agent i over a private good and a public good
are represented by the utility function U i (xi, Y ) = xiY, where xi ≥ 0 is his
private good consumption level, and Y is the total public good level, ∀i ∈ N .
Definition 7 : A public good provision mechanism is a function ρ :
Qn
i=1 [ω, ω] −→
<n+×<+ that assigns, for each possible profile of agents’ initial endowments
Ω = (ω1, · · ·, ωn), a vector (ρx1 (Ω) , · · ·, ρxn (Ω)) indicating the private good
consumption level for each agent i, and a public good level ρY (Ω) such
that
Pn
i=1 ρ
x
i (Ω) + ρ
Y (Ω) ≤
Pn
i=1 ωi.
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Definition 8 : A public good provision mechanism ρ :
Qn
i=1 [ω, ω] −→ <n+×<+
is ex-post eﬃcient if for no profile Ω = (ω1, · · ·, ωn) is there an ((x1, · · ·, xn) , Y ) ∈
<n+×<+, satisfying
Pn
i=1 xi+Y ≤
Pn
i=1 ωi, such that U
i (xi, Y ) ≥ U i
¡
ρxi (Ω) , ρ
Y (Ω)
¢
for every i, and U i (xi, Y ) > U i
¡
ρxi (Ω) , ρ
Y (Ω)
¢
for some i.
It can be checked that the unique ex-post eﬃcient level of public good when
U i (xi, Y ) = xiY , ∀i ∈ N , will be
1
2
nX
i=1
ωi. (22)
4.1 Eﬃcient prizes for the contest in private good con-
sumption levels
The results of Section 3 show that while a rank-order contest in private good
consumption levels in which higher consumption is rewarded exacerbates the
underprovision of the public good, a contest in which higher consumption is
punished will ameliorate the level of public good provided through voluntary
contributions. Proposition 9 below demonstrates how the ex-post eﬃcient level
of the public good can be achieved in a rank-order contest.
Proposition 9 : Assume that the preferences of agents over a private good, a
public good, and a set of n prizes {p1, p2, · · ·, pn} are as in (??), and let their
initial endowments be uniformly distributed on [ω, ω]. In an n-agent rank-order
contest in private good consumption levels, the unique ex-post eﬃcient level of
public good (22) can be attained by setting the diﬀerence between each prize level
equally at
∆p = pk − pk−1 = −E(ω)∆ω4α , ∀k = 2, · · ·, n , (23)
where E (ω) denotes the expected value of initial endowments, and ∆ω = ω−ω.
Proof. Observe from (19) in Proposition 6 that with diﬀerences in prizes equally
set as in (23), each agent i will contribute 12ωi, leading to the ex-post eﬃcient
total public good level 12
Pn
i=1 ωi.
Proposition 9 shows that punishing higher private good consumption, or,
equivalently, rewarding lower private good consumption with suitable prize dif-
ferences will lead to eﬃciency. Note also that ∆p in (23) is independent of
n.
The assumption that allows us to obtain ex-post eﬃency in Propostion 9
is that the utility functions in (??) are additively separable in prizes. This
renders the prize in our model a third good, distinct from the private and the
public goods. In fact, we interpreted the prizes, following Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite [12], as a nonmarketed good allocated to the agents through a rank-
order contest. Additive separability in this third good is a certain special case.
To understand the role of additive separability of the utility functions in
this third good, consider instead the case where the prizes are denominated in
terms of the private good. Specifically, consider for the 2-agent case that the
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agent with the higher private good consumption pays an amount T in private
good, taken as the numeraire good, to the agent with lower private good con-
sumption. That is, consider a two-good model in which there is a lump-sum
tax on higher consumption. Such a model is similar to the models treated in
Bayesian mechanism design literature, the relevant class in our case being the
expected externality mechanism due to d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [15] and
Arrow [4]. Note that the taxing scheme we impose will be ex-post balanced,
since
P
i Ti = 0. In parallel to the model used so far, let the utility of agent i
be given by
U i (xi, Y, T ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(xi − T )Y if xi > xj
xiY if xi = xj
(xi + T )Y if xi < xj
, j 6= i.
Following the same procedure as in Section 3.1 we obtain symmetric strategies
linear in type ω given by
bx (ω) = ½ ω if ω ≤ ω < ω0¡1
2 −
3T
∆ω
¢
ω + b if ω0 ≤ ω ≤ ω
, (24)
which are of the form similar to the case with additive separability and involve
a cut oﬀ initial endowment level below which types of agents do not contribute
toward the public good. It can immediately be observed from (24) that, as
opposed to the case with additive separability, the slope of the strategy for the
contributing agents involves the parameter T , and the cut oﬀ point ωo can not
be reduced to ω to have all agents with ω > 0 contribute on the way to achieving
the ex-post eﬃcient level of public good.
The expected externality mechanism due to d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet
[15] mentioned above considers an environment in which agents’ utility func-
tions are quasi-linear, which is not the case in our model, and their types are
statistically independent, as in our model.13 They constructed a mechanism
involving transfers among agents for the quasi-linear environment which they
demonstrate to be ex-post eﬃcient. We do not have ex-post eﬃciency in the
two-good version of our model of contribution contest, as we have just shown.
However, since our utility functions are not quasi-linear we are not considering
the same envrionment as in their model. Another problem with the expected
externality mechanism of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is that it may lead
lead to outcomes which are not individually rational, i.e. some agents may lack
incentives to participate in the mechanism when reservation utility constraints
are taken into consideration. The outcome in a contest of the sort we examine
here will always satisfy individual rationality, since agents have the option of
not contributing to the public good.
13See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [25], Section 23D, for a discussion of the properties
of the mechanism due to d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet.
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4.2 Possibility of a contest in contributions toward the
public good
The discussion above on the relation between our model and the Bayesian mech-
anism design literature suggests the possibility of having agents compete for
prizes in terms of amount contributed toward the public good, instead of the
competition in private good consumption levels as we have done here. That is,
we could equivalently consider a rank-order contest in terms of contributions
toward the public good.
The rank-order contest in terms of contributions toward the public good does
not, however, have an equilibrium in pure strategies in our model. To see this,
consider a contest that rewards higher contributions to the public good. First
note that the equilibrium in this case cannot involve a symmetric strategy with
a cut oﬀ initial endowment level ω0 below which types do not contribute. Given
that types below ω0 do not contribute, an agent with ω < ω0 would have a finite
expected gain for an arbitrarily small increase in the amount contributed, hence
he is better oﬀ not following the strategy which prescribes a zero contribution.
A pair of asymmetric strategies, one strictly increasing in initial endowment
and the other involving a cut oﬀ level ω0, cannot be an equilibrium, either.
Facing a pure strategy with a cut oﬀ level ω0, for agents with types ω < ω0
any nonzero choice of contribution will be dominated by a smaller contribution.
Equilibrium cannot involve a strictly increasing symmetric pure strategy either.
The type ω agent has no incentive to distort his contribution from the case
when the prize does not matter, since the probability that he wins the contest
is zero. He will continue to contribute zero. Given that type ω does not change
his contribution, a type infinitesimally higher ω will also have no incentive to
distort his contribution from the level with no prize. And similarly for all types
ω < ω0 that contribute zero in the no prize situation which will also continue
not to contribute. But we have just argued that a pure strategy equilibrium
cannot involve any types not contributing.
That even simple bidding games may have no equilibria, pure or otherwise,
is well known.14 The diﬀerence between the contest in terms of private good
consumptionl levels and contest in contributions to the public good in our model
is that the payoﬀ function is not continuous in contributions around zero for all
types of agents.15
5 Discussion and Concluding Words
We studied a public good environment with incomplete information in which
agents’ decisions to contribute to public good were further complicated by
agents’ concern for relative position in the group. Depending on their ordi-
nal rank in the distribution of private good consumption levels, financed by
14See Milgrom and Weber [28].
15On the existence of Nash equilibrium in games with discontinuities see Dasgupta and
Maskin [14], Simon [34], and Reny [31].
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their residual wealth after the contribution, agents were assigned prizes. We
derived and studied the properties of a symmetric equilibrium for the simple
model considered. We showed that this symmetric equilibrium involves strate-
gies linear in initial endowment, and demonstrated how, depending on whether
higher private good consumption is awarded or punished, it leads either to lower
or higher contributions toward the public good, respectively. We also showed
that a proper choice of prize levels in our model will result in the ex-post eﬃcient
level of public good.
The utility function we consider as describing the identical preferences of
individuals is additively separable in the prize that is distributed through a
rank-order contest. This is admittedly a special case, and it partly derives the
linearity of the equilibrium strategies that we obtain. We adopted a simple
form for preferences for simplicity and tractability in examining the questions
we found of interest in the Introduction. We believe that equilibrium strategies
in public good environments incorporating concern for relative position can
be shown to exist for more general preferences, and is likely to exhibit the
qualitative aspects of some of the results derived here. We will investigate more
general classes of preferences in future research.
The main force deriving the linearity of strategies in our model is the fact that
each agent’s maximization problem involves an expression which is quadratic in
the choice variable.16 A particular feature of the equilibrium in our model is
that the concern for relative position has only a level eﬀect on agents’ strategies.
Concern for relative position does not aﬀect the slope of the symmetric equilib-
rium strategy in Section 3. This property is a consequence jointly of the additive
separability and the quadratic nature of each agent’s maximization problem.
The role played by the uniformity of the distribution of initial endowments
for obtaining linear equilibrium strategies is also apparent from derivation of
the equilibrium in Section 3. There will be equilibrium strategies in our model
linear in inital endowment for probability distributions other than the uniform
distribution.17
The symmetric linear strategy we exhibited for the n-agent case also involve
a specific assumption on the prize structure, namely that prizes are equally
spread. That there may be no equilibrium strategy, symmetric or otherwise,
for arbitrary prize structures is apparent. An interesting question to ask in
our model is to compare an n-agent rank order contest with n prizes and an
n-agent rank order contest with only 2 prizes. There will not be an equilibrium
linear in initial endowments in Section 3.2 when we consider only 2 prizes, even
with uniformly distributed initial endowments. The flexibility oﬀered by the
existence of many levels of prizes is partially demonstrated in Proposition 6,
16The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategies in a quadratic decision problem
with uncertainty has been extensively studied in optimal control literature. The linearity of
the equilibrium strategies for certain probability distributions for the random variable is also
well established. On both points see Ba s¸ar [7]. Also see Ba s¸ar and Ho [8].
17 See Ba s¸sar and Ho [8] for existence of linear equilibrium strategies in environments similar
to ours. For example, we can consider the form f (ω) = βω + ε for the density function of
initial endowments. There will be a symmetric equilbrium for certain values of the parameters
β and ε. Note that the uniform distribution is the special case of this form, with β = 0.
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which exhibits a simple linear strategy with evenly spaced prize levels.
In Section 4.2 we discussed the possibility of having a rank-order contest
in the amount contributed to the public good. Unlike the rank-order contest
in private good consumption levels, we argued that there is no pure strategy
equilibrium in our model when the contest is in the amount contributed to the
public good. In future research we will address the issue of existence of mixed
strategy equilibria in such cases.
The contribution games we examined are one-period static games. Alterna-
tively, in an environment similar to ours one can consider a multi-period game
in which agents make incremental contributions to the public good each period
until they find it optimal to stop and receive a prize according to the ordinal
rank of their contribution.
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